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1 Introduction
The theory of implementation investigates the goals a designer can attain when they
depend on the information possessed by various agents. The Nash implementation
problem of the designer entails devising a mechanism in which agents incentives
lead to Nash equilibrium allocations associated with the goals set by the designer
(Maskin, 1999). When such a mechanism exists, the designers goals are (fully) Nash
implementable. This paper studies the two-agent implementation problem in a setting
with incomplete information, in which agents possess exclusive information. In such
environments, the Nash implementation has a natural analog, referred to as Bayesian
implementation. In Bayesian environments, a social choice function (SCF) f is a
function from states to allocations, whereas a social choice set (SCS) F is a collection
of SCFs.
With the exception of Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990) and Dutta and Sen
(1994), all studies on Bayesian implementation assume there are more than two agents
(e.g., see Palfrey and Srivastava, 1989b; Jackson, 1991). Whereas Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (1990) propose a general procedure on how to modify an incentive com-
patible revelation mechanism to Bayesian implement an SCS, Dutta and Sen (1994)
provide a su¢ cient and almost necessary condition for two-agent Bayesian imple-
mentation. Conversely, this paper is concerned with the relationship between the
two-agent Bayesian implementation problem and the concept of interim e¢ ciency of
Holmström and Myerson (1983).
When agents are asymmetrically informed, an (interim) incentive compatibility
condition is necessary for Bayesian implementation. An SCF f is incentive compatible
when truth telling is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct mechanism associated with
f . While incentive compatibility is su¢ cient to ensure the existence of desirable
equilibria, more restrictions are required on SCFs to rule out undesirable equilibria.
The notion of interim incentive e¢ ciency of Holmström and Myerson (1983) in-
spires the main restriction imposed on SCSs in this paper. That is, an SCF f is
interim e¢ cient if there is no other SCF f^ that would make every type of every agent
as well o¤ as f does, and would make at least one type strictly better o¤; that is, the
SCF is interim e¢ cient if it is welfare undominated. In other words, interim e¢ ciency
is a natural analog of Pareto e¢ ciency when agents have private information. An SCF
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is interim incentive e¢ cient if it is incentive compatible and interim e¢ cient.
This paper proposes a su¢ cient condition, called closure under interim utility
equivalence. An SCS F satises this condition if each SCF f in F is interim incentive
e¢ cient, and whenever an incentive compatible SCF f 0 makes every possible type of
every agent at least as well o¤ as does f in F (in the interim stage), then f 0 must be
an element of F . When F is an SCF, closure requires f 0 = F . Additionally, when
F is an SCF, closure implies that the interim utility vector of F is unique for every
agent under the set of all incentive compatible allocation rules.
Hitherto, no study uses the property of interim e¢ ciency for exploring the Bayesian
implementation of SCSs. While a few papers on mechanism design explore the prop-
erty of interim e¢ ciency but are limited either to a few applications or a specic
environment.1
We show that every SCF satisfying closure is Bayesian implementable in envi-
ronments with private values and independent types. Interestingly, this characteri-
zation result provides an understanding of what can be implemented (e.g., in non-
transferable utility settings) when the designer considers not only incentive compati-
bility but also full implementation. Our ndings are di¤erent from those of previous
studies. Palfrey and Srivastava (1989a, 1991) show that, in private value models, the
multiple equilibrium problem can be avoided if agents do not play weakly dominated
strategies in equilibrium. Ollár and Penta (2017) address the same issue and also con-
sider common knowledge assumptions by studying full implementation via transfer
schemes under general restrictions on agentsbeliefs.
When an SCF f of interest is interim incentive e¢ cient but does not satisfy
closure, it may be natural to turn to the implementation of a second best and try to
implement an SCS that consists of allocation rules that are interim incentive e¢ cient
and welfare equivalent to f for every possible type of every agent. We provide a
characterization result for this second best. In addition to closure, this result relies
on another auxiliary condition, called interim inseparability. Generally, F is interim
1For instance, Gresik (1996) and Wilson (1985) focus on bilateral trade applications, particularly
double auctions. Laussel and Palfrey (2003) and Ledyard and Palfrey (1994, 1999a, 1999b, 2002)
study the applications to public good mechanisms. Ledyard and Palfrey (2007) investigate interim
e¢ ciency in private value environments, in which agentsutility functions are both quasi-linear in a
private good and linear in a one-dimensional private value type parameter.
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inseparable if f 0 makes every possible type of every agent as well o¤ as does f when
these allocation rules are both in F . This result then yields a characterization that
applies to essentially single-valued SCSs (at the interim stage).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
notation and model. Section 3 presents the characterization result for SCFs, whereas
Section 4 focuses on SCSs. Section 5 concludes the paper. The Appendix presents
the proofs not included in the main text.
2 Notation and denitions
The set of agents is denoted by I = f1; 2g and the set of (pure) decisions by D.
The set of lotteries over D is denoted by (D). Each agent i privately observes a
parameter i that determines her/his preferences. We refer to i as agent is type.
The set of possible types for agent i is assumed to be nite and is denoted by i. A
state is any pair of types  = (1; 2) 2 12  . For each agent i, we use  i to
express the set of possible types of agent j 6= i and, thus, a state is a prole (i;  i)
where i 2 i and  i 2  i. The same notational convention applies to any prole
of objects.
An SCF or allocation rule is a function x : ! (D) from states to lotteries over
D. The set of all allocation rules is denoted by X = fx j x :  ! (D)g. Further,
an SCS F is any (non-empty) subset of X.
Each agent i is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer, whose (Bernoulli)
utility function is ui (x; ) in state  2 . We focus on the case in which each
agents preference depends only on her/his type, known as private values. In this
case, agent is utility function, ui (x; ), can be denoted by ui (d; i) in state  2 .
The probability density over the possible realizations of  2  is denoted by q (). We
assume that q () has full support, that is, q () > 0 for all  2 .2 For each type i of
agent i, the conditional probability of  i 2  i is the posterior belief of type i and
is denoted by q ( iji). We assume types to be stochastically independent. That is,
2An alternative informational setting is that of nonexclusive information (see, e.g., Postlewaite
and Schmeidler, 1986; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1986). In this setting, each agentsown information
is redundant if other individuals pool their information.
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q() = q1(1)q2(2), where, for each agent i 2 I, qi is a probability distribution over
i.
Given allocation rule x 2 X, the (interim) expected utility of agent i of type i is
dened by:
Uxi (i) =
X
 i2 i
q ( iji)  vi (x( i; i); i) ,
where vi (x( i; i); i) is the expected utility of lottery x( i; i), computed using the
utility function ui (x; i).
An environment is a list hI;D; q; (ui;i)i2Ii in which each element is assumed
to be common knowledge among agents. Agent i knows her/his own type i but is
unsure about  i.
A mechanism is a pair   = (M; g), whereM = M1M2 is the message space and
g : M ! (D) is the outcome function. A (pure) strategy for agent i is a function
si : i ! Mi and the set of all strategies for agent i is Si = fsi : i !Mig. A
strategy prole is a list s  (s1; s2) of strategies, one for each agent. The space of
all strategy proles is S = S1  S2. Given strategy prole s, we denote by g (s) the
outcome generated by s, where the outcome in state  is denoted by g (s ()). For
exposition, we only focus below on pure strategies; most concepts and results can be
extended to cover the case of mixed strategies (as discussed in Section 5).
Given a mechanism  , a Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium of   is a strategy prole s,
so that for each agent i 2 I and each type i 2 i, it holds that:
U
g(s)
i (i)  U
g(s0i;s i)
i (i) for all s
0
i 2 Si.
Let us denote the set of all Bayesian equilibria of mechanism   by B( ).
A mechanism   implements F in Bayesian equilibria if
fg (s) js 2 B( )g = F .
If there exists a mechanism   that implements F in Bayesian equilibria, F is said to
be Bayesian implementable.
A necessary condition for Bayesian implementation is incentive compatibility, de-
ned as follows.
Denition 1. F is (Bayesian) incentive compatible if, for all f 2 F , all i 2 I, and
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all i 2 i,
U fi (i)  U fi

^i; i

, for all ^i 2 i,
where U fi

^i; i

is the (interim) expected utility of type i when the agent reports
^i, that is:
U fi

^i; i

=
X
 i2 i
q( i j i)  vi

f( i; ^i); i

.
We denote U fi (i)  U fi (i; i).
The proof of the necessity of this condition for implementation in Bayesian equi-
libria has been provided, for instance, by Dasgupta et al. (1979) and Jackson (1991).
The intuition behind the condition is straightforward: an SCF is incentive compatible
if truthful revelation is the best response for each agent whenever the other agents
also reveal their true types.3
3 Implementation of SCFs
Since agentstypes are determined at the interim stage, our notion of e¢ ciency is that
of interim e¢ ciency, based on Holmoström and Myerson (1983). The key is identifying
the appropriate notion of interim e¢ ciency, which we call closure under interim utility
equivalence. Before stating this condition, we need the following additional notation.
Let XIC be the set of all incentive compatible allocation rules, that is:
XIC  fx 2 X j x is incentive compatibleg.
An SCF f^ welfare dominates f if f^ makes the expected utility of every possible type
of every agent at least as large as f does and makes the expected utility of some types
of some agents strictly larger. That is, f^ welfare dominates f if U f^i (i)  U fi (i) for
all i 2 i and all i 2 I, and U f^i (i) > U fi (i) for some i 2 i and some i 2 I.
An SCF f is interim incentive e¢ cient if f is incentive compatible and no allocation
rule in XIC welfare dominates it. That is, f is interim incentive e¢ cient if f 2 XIC
and there is no f^ 2 XIC such that U f^i (i)  U fi (i) for all i 2 i and all i 2 I and
3See dAspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979, 1982) for a more indepth discussion on incentive
compatibility.
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U f^i (i) > U
f
i (i) for some i 2 i and some i 2 I. Therefore, we posit the following
denition.
Denition 2. F satises closure under interim utility equivalence, or simply closure,
if every f 2 F is interim incentive e¢ cient and, for all f 2 F and all x 2 XIC , it
holds that:
Uxi (i) = U
f
i (i) for all i 2 I and all i 2 i =) x 2 F .
This condition is composed of two parts. The rst requires no incentive compatible
allocation rule can welfare dominate f 2 F . The second requires that, if an incentive
compatible allocation rule x 2 XIC and an SCF f 2 F are equally good for every
possible type of every agent, then x is also in F . When F is an SCF, closure requires
x = F . Additionally, when F is an SCF, closure implies that the interim utility vector
of F is unique for every agent under the set of all incentive compatible allocation
rules. Therefore, our rst result is that every SCF satisfying closure is Bayesian
implementable.
Theorem 1. If f satises closure under interim utility equivalence, then it is Bayesian
implementable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 1. From the proof of Theorem 1, it is clear it holds for any nite number
of agents.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of augmenting the direct revelation mechanism
associated with f and specifying outcomes so that f is fully implemented in Bayesian
equilibria if it satises closure. While a detailed proof of the theorem is given in the
Appendix, we briey describe it here. When agent i announces type i in the direct
revelation mechanism associated with f , s/he expects to face a lottery whose outcome
is f( i; i) with probability qi( iji). By using a random device, we can construct
a lottery `i (f; i) yielding outcome f( i; i) with probability qi( iji). Since values
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are independent and private, agent i will be indi¤erent between lottery `i (f; i) and
the one obtained by participating in the direct revelation mechanism provided that
the other agent is truthful. The devised mechanism uses other components of agents
message spaces, in addition to type announcements, to guarantee each agent i can
always obtain `i (f; i), regardless what the other agent reports. Due to this feature,
each Bayesian equilibrium produces an interim expected utility at least as great as
that produced by f . The result follows by the assumption that f satises closure.
More importantly, Theorem 1 shows what can be implemented (e.g., in non-
transferable utility settings) when the designer considers not only incentive com-
patibility but also full implementation. This is di¤erent from the solution provided
by Palfrey and Srivastava (1989a, 1991), who show that, in private value models the
multiple equilibrium problem can be avoided if agents do not play weakly dominated
strategies in equilibrium.
In the following, we briey discuss the implications of the above result.
Example 1 (Information design). Let hI;D; q; (ui;i)i2Ii be an environment such
that the ex-post sum of utilities
v1(x; 1) + v2(x; 2)
has a unique maximizer in all states  2 . Under this assumption, the maximizer is
a pure decision.4 We can dene f by setting:
f() = arg max
x2D
[u1(x; 1) + u2(x; 2)],
for each  2 .
As we assume the existence of a unique maximizer for the ex-post sum of utilities,
f satises closure if it is incentive compatible. However, the incentive compatibility of
f depends on whether the designer can a¤ect agentsprior beliefs so that f becomes
incentive compatible. If the designer succeeds in this information design exercise, f
is Bayesian implementable according to Theorem 1.
4Indeed, if lottery x 2 (D) maximizes the ex-post sum of utilities, all decisions in the support
of x must also maximize this sum. Since we require the maximizer to be unique, x is a degenerated
lottery.
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To show that the designer can succeed in this task, let us further specify Example
1 by considering two cases a voting environment and a public good environment.
Example 2 (Veto rule). A committee of two agents has to select a job applicant
from a set of three candidates, D = fa; b; cg. In each state  2 , each committee
member has a strict preference ranking over D. Therefore, each state  2  can
be identied by the pair of strict preferences (1;2). We assume  includes all
possible strict preference proles, that is, for any pair of strict preferences (1;2),
there exists  2  so that (1;2) = (1;2) (unrestricted domain).
To complete the model, we need to x agentsutility functions. Assume that, for
any state , agent 1s utility function assigns utility of 3 to the preferred candidate,
1 to the middle candidate, and 0 to the least preferred candidate. Agent 2s utility
function assigns utility of 1 to the preferred candidate, 1
2
to the middle candidate,
and -3 to the least preferred candidate.
The hiring process proceeds as follows. First, agent 2 vetoes the worst candidate
d 2 D. Second, agent 1 selects one candidate from D   fdg. Let rki () be the
candidate that committee member i ranks kth in state . If both committee members
act truthfully, the hiring process implements f dened by:
f() = arg max
x2fr12();r22()g
u1(x; 1),
for each  2 . However, this rule is manipulable ex-post.5
Suppose that each state is equally likely. Under this assumption, f is incentive
compatible. Agent 1 has no reason to lie. Moreover, regardless which candidate agent
2 vetoes, agent 1 would select each of the remaining candidates with probability 1
2
.
This implies lying is not protable (on average) for agent 2 either.
Since f is incentive compatible, to show f is implementable according to Theorem
1, it su¢ ces to verify that f() uniquely maximizes the ex-post sum of utilities in
each state  2 . As such, it su¢ ces to note that the candidate maximizing the
5Indeed, there are cases in which agent 2 would not veto her/his worst candidate if s/he knew
agent 1s ranking. As such, let  be so that the ranking of agent 1 is a 1 b 1 c and that of agent
2 is b 2 a 2 c. When the hiring procedure is followed, agent 2 vetoes c, meaning that candidate
a would be hired. However, if agent 2 knew agent 1s ranking, s/he vetoes a because agent 2 would
know that agent 1 would never select candidate c. In this case, agent 2s best candidate is hired.
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ex-post sum in each state  is the top candidate for agent 1 if s/he is not the worst
candidate for agent 2; otherwise, s/he is the second best candidate for agent 1.
Example 3 (Facility location). Let D = f1; : : : ; kg  Z+ be the set of locations to
build a public facility. There are two groups, with types 1 = 2 = f1; : : : ; kg. Type
i = h of group i means h is the most preferred location. We assume that preferences
are single-peaked, that is, for each group i 2 f1; 2g and each location d 2 D,
ui(d; i) =  ji   dj for all i 2 i.
The goal of the designer is to build the public facility in the best location of the
group nearest to location 1. This goal is obviously strategy-proof and, thus, incentive
compatible. However, there are other locations that yield exactly the same ex-post
sum of utilities. This is because the ex-post sum u1(x; 1) + u2(x; 2) is constant for
all locations d between peaks 1 and 2. Therefore, the goal of the designer does not
necessarily satisfy closure, although it is incentive compatible.
As such, assume there exists a third group with known type 3 = 1 (see Remark
1). The utility function of this group is u3(d; 1) =  j1  dj. After the introduction of
the new group, the goal of the designer can be expressed as follows: for all  2  
1 2  f3g,
f() = medianf1; 2; 3g.
It is well-known this SCF is strategy-proof and, hence, incentive compatible.
To show f is Bayesian implementable, we only need to show f () is the unique
maximizer of the ex-post sum of utilities in each state  2 . To this end, we x any
 2 . Assume, to the contrary, that there exists another location d 6= f () that
maximizes the ex-post sum of utilities, that is:
3X
i=1
ui(d; i) =
3X
i=1
ui(f () ; i). (1)
We proceed according to whether d < f () or not.
Assume d < f (). This implies 1 = 3  d < f (). Without loss of generality,
we assume f () = 2. Then, it holds that 1 = 3  d < f () = 2  1. Since agents
have single-peaked preferences, it follows from (1) that
  (1   d)  (2   d) + (3   d) =   (1   2) + (3   2) ,
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which simplies to d = 2, which is a contradiction.
Assume d > f (). This implies 1 = 3  f () < d. Without loss of generality, we
assume f () = 2. Then, it holds that 1 = 3  f () = 2 < d. We thus distinguish
two cases.
Assume 1  d. Then, we have 1 = 3  f () = 2 < d  1. It follows from (1)
that:
  (1   d) + (2   d) + (3   d) =   (1   2) + (3   2) ,
which simplies to d = 2, which is a contradiction.
Assume 1 < d. In this case, it holds that 1 = 3  f () = 2  1 < d. It follows
from (1) that:
(1   d) + (2   d) + (3   d) =   (1   2) + (3   2) ,
which simplies to 3d = 21 + 2. Since 2  1 < d, it follows that 3d > 21 + 2,
which is a contradiction. Thus, f satises closure.
Example 4 (Bilateral trading). Let us consider a bilateral trading problem in
which agent 1 has an indivisible object that agent 2 wants to buy. The valuation
of agent i is denoted by vi, drawn from a set Vi  R+ according to the distribution
Fi. Both agents are risk neutral. A trading rule or selling mechanism is a pair (p; t),
where p : V1  V2 ! [0; 1]2 is the allocation rule and t : V1  V2 ! R2 is the payment
rule. If v1 and v2 are the valuations reported by agents, pi(v1; v2) is the probability
the object is transferred to agent i, and ti(v1; v2) is the expected payment of agent i.
In the following, we show it is generically impossible to apply Theorem 1 to bi-
lateral trading environments. Let ` be a lottery that yields t 2 R+ monetary units
with probability 1
2
and  t monetary units with probability 1
2
, and (p; t) any interim
incentive e¢ cient trading rule. We dene a new trading mechanism (p; t0) by setting
t0(v1; v2) = t(v1; v2) + ` for each pair of valuations (v1; v2) 2 V1  V2.6 (p; t0) is an
incentive compatible trading mechanism. Since E(`) = 0 by construction, it follows
that every type of every agent is indi¤erent between (p; t0) and (p; t). However, since
(p; t0) 6= (p; t), the second part of closure is violated. In the next subsection, we
propose a solution to this problem.
6t(v1; v2) + ` is a compound lottery, where the outcomes of t(v1; v2) and ` are added.
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4 Implementation of SCSs
Let us turn briey to the problem of implementing an SCS, that is, of ensuring
all SCFs f 2 F and only these are obtained as Bayesian equilibria. We consider
SCSs because there exist cases in which Theorem 1 cannot be applied. To this end,
assume that f is not fully implementable according to Theorem 1, although it is
interim incentive e¢ cient (see Example 4). In cases such as this one, it is natural
to turn to the second best solution. One appealing resolution here is to enlarge the
objective of implementation by fully implementing all allocation rules that are welfare
equivalent to f . Therefore, besides closure, we require F to satisfy the following
auxiliary condition.
Denition 3. F is interim inseparable if U fi (i) = U
f^
i (i) holds for all i 2 I, all
i 2 i and all f; f^ 2 F .
In other words, F is interim inseparable when agents wish to fully implement f
and agree to fully implement any allocation rule f^ that makes every possible type of
every agent as well o¤ as f does (at the interim stage). The characterization result
can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2. If F satises closure under interim utility equivalence and interim
inseparability, then it is Bayesian implementable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 2. It is obvious from the proof of Theorem 2 that it holds for any nite
number of agents.
Let us briey discuss two implications of Theorem 2.
Example 5 (Bordas rule). A committee of two agents has to select one candidate
from D = fd1; d2; : : : ; dkg. Let k  3. At each state  2 , each committee member
has a strict preference ranking over D. Therefore, each  2  can be identied by
a pair of strict preferences (1;2). We assume that  includes all possible strict
preference proles, that is, for any pair of strict preferences (1;2), there exists
 2  so that (1;2) = (1;2) (unrestricted domain).
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Suppose each state  2  is equally likely. Furthermore, for any state  2  and
any agent i, assume that the utility representation of the ranking i is a one-to-one
assignment of numbers 1; 2; :::; k to the elements of D. In this setting, rank ri(d`; i)
of candidate d` 2 D for type i of agent i is given by:
ri(d`; i) = (k + 1)  ui(d`; i).
The set of all Borda winners in state  2 , denoted by B(), is dened by
B() = arg min
d2D
[r1(d; 1) + r2(d; 2)] .
Nothing guarantees the Borda winner is a fairoutcome. As such, an outcome
best for one agent and worst for the other can be a Borda winner.7 Thus, let us dene
the set of fair Borda winnersby:
FB() = arg min
d2B()
[max fr1(d; 1); r2(d; 2)g] ,
for each  2 . The goal of the designer is to implement f that selects a uniform
distribution, dened over the set of fair Borda winners, that is:
f()  U (FB()) .
This SCF is incentive compatible. Intuitively, if an agent lies, then s/he will lose
equally often as s/he wins, as every type of the other agent is equally likely. On
average, lying does not pay o¤. Moreover, this SCF is on the interim e¢ ciency
frontier, as f() maximizes the sum of utilities at each state  2 . However, there
are other selections of Borda winners that yield exactly the same interim expected
utilities for all types of committee members. Theorem 2 helps in situations such as
this one guaranteeing that an SCS F that contains f and any other allocation rule
f 0 2 F so that (1) f 0 is incentive compatible, (2) supp(f 0())  B() for all  2 
(f 0 makes a selection of Borda winners) and (3) Ui(f 0; i) = Ui(f; i) for both i 2 I
and all i 2 i (interim inseparability) is Bayesian implementable.8 Although the
7In this case, B() = D.
8Note that supp(f 0()) consists of the pure decisions that have non-zero probability according to
lottery f 0 ().
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allocation rules in F are not necessarily fair ex-post, they are all fair on average or in
expectation.9
Example 6 (Optimal selling mechanism). A seller s has one indivisible object
to be sold to buyer 1 or buyer 2. The valuation of buyer i is denoted by vi and drawn
from a nite set Vi  i  R+ according to distribution Fi. Buyers valuations are
private and independent. Both the seller and buyers are risk neutral.
A trading rule is a pair (p; t), where p : V1V2 ! [0; 1]2 is the allocation rule and t :
V1V2 ! R2 is the payment rule. For any pair of valuations v = (v1; v2), we interpret
pi(v) as the probability with which agent i obtains the object, and ti(v) is the expected
payment of agent i. The goal of the seller is to nd an individually rational and
incentive compatible trading rule that maximizes expected revenue E[t1 (v) + t2 (v)].
This problem has been solved by Skreta (2007) by generalizing the method of Myerson
(1981). Let us denote the revenue maximizing trading rule by (p; t).10
Note (p; t) is not necessarily on the interim e¢ ciency frontier of buyers. The
reason is that each buyer would be better o¤ by slightly decreasing her/his payment
without reducing the welfare of the other buyer. To ensure we are at the interim
e¢ ciency frontier, we consider the seller as a player, that is I = fs; 1; 2g. In this way,
if a buyer pays less, s/he decreases the welfare of the seller. Let us assume that the
reservation price, vs, of the seller is common knowledge among the agents. That is,
let s = fvsg. Recall that Theorem 2 holds for any number of agents (see Remark
2). Additionally, if trading rule (p; t) yields an interim expected utility equal to that
generated by the revenue maximizing trading rule (p; t), for each type of each agent,
trading rule (p; t) is individually rational (at the interim stage) and expected revenue
maximizing. Then, let us dene F by:11
F =
n
(p; t) j (p; t) is IC and U (p;t)i (i) = U (p
;t)
i (i) for all i 2 i and all i 2 I
o
.
F is Bayesian implementable according to Theorem 2 by construction. It is worth
noting that all possible outcomes are expected revenue maximizing.
9If one committee member benets in one state, then the other committee member must benet
in another, that is, not the same committee member benets always.
10For details, we refer the reader to Skreta (2007).
11IC means incentive compatible.
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Remark 3. In practice, we do not need to know F either in Example 5 or Exam-
ple 6. To better understand this, let us focus on Example 6. Let us consider the
revenue maximizing trading rule (p; t) of Skreta (2007). Consider the mechanism
constructed in the proof of Theorem 1. Assume that the seller is an agent in I. In
this case, any trading rule that arises as a Bayesian equilibrium of the mechanism
yields an interim expected utility at least as high as that for (p; t) for every type of
every agent in I. Note the interim expected utility of the seller cannot be higher than
that for (p; t); otherwise, this trading rule is not a revenue maximizing one. There-
fore, whatever is the equilibrium outcome of the mechanism, it will achieve revenue
maximization, although we do not know the set F .
5 Concluding remarks
The focus of this paper is on Bayesian implementation in pure strategies. However,
characterization results extend to the case of mixed strategies. For instance, assume
the hypotheses of Theorem 1 are met and let us consider the mechanism constructed
in its proof. First, note that a pure strategy equilibrium that coincides with f is
still an equilibrium, although mixed strategies are allowed. Second, assume that a
(non-degenerate) mixed strategy prole  = (1; 2) is a Bayesian equilibrium. It
follows that every message in the support of i (i) yields the same interim expected
utility for every type i of agent i. By the proposed mechanism, this interim expected
utility is at least as high as that produced by the lottery `i (f; i). The proof goes
through since f satises closure.
The assumption of private values with independent types is central to our analysis,
allowing us to construct a mechanism where agent i of type i can obtain the lottery
`i (f; i) that makes her/him at least as well o¤ (at the interim stage) as the lottery
in the direct revelation mechanism, regardless what the other agent  i is doing.
Although the construction in the proof of Theorem 1 is not always feasible when
values are common and/or types are correlated, a similar construction can be provided
when the SCF can be virtually simulated. Generally, f can be virtually simulated if
one can nd, for each agent i, an "incentive compatible set of lotteries" that gives
to agent i a level of expected utility that coincides with that s/he can obtain by
15
participating in the direct revelation mechanism associated with f under truthful
behavior. More formally, for any agent i and any SCF f , let `i (f) denote a (non-
empty) subset of  (D). We say that the set `i (f) virtually simulates the SCF f if,
for every i 2 i, there is a lottery `fi (i) 2 `i (f) so that (1) U fi (i) = U `
f
i (i)
i (i) and
(2) U `
f
i (i)
i (i)  U `
f
i (
0
i)
i (i) for every 
0
i 2 i, where for all i 2 i:
U
`fi (
i)
i (i) =
X
 i2 i
q ( iji)  vi

`fi (
i); ( i; i)

, for all i 2 i.
If, for each agent i, `i (f) virtually simulates f , we say that f is virtually simulated
by (`1 (f) ; `2 (f)).
It can be shown that an SCF is Bayesian implementable in any environment if it
satises closure and can be virtually simulated.12 This follows from exactly the same
arguments used for private values and independent types when lottery `i (f; i) is
replaced with lottery `fi (i). It will be interesting to know the classes of environments
under which a given SCF can be virtually simulated. This topic will be addressed in
future research.
Appendix
Notation: For any x 2 X, i 2 I, and i 2 i, we dene lottery `i(x; i) as follows:
the outcome is x( i; i) with probability q ( iji) for all  i 2  i. In a private
value environment with independent types, if x is incentive compatible, then agent
i of type i weakly prefers `i(x; i) to `i(x; 0i) for all 
0
i 2 i. A deception for agent
i 2 I is a mapping i : i ! i. Let Ai be the set of all deceptions for agent i and
A = A1  A2, with  as a typical prole of deceptions. For any  2 A, any x 2 X,
and any , the lottery delivered by (x  ) is (x  ) ().
Proof of Theorem 1
Assume that f satises closure. Consider   = (M1 M2; g), whereMi = if0; 1g
Z+, that is, each agent is asked to report a type, an element of the set f0; 1g and a
12Note that any two lotteries, `i (f; i) and ` i (f;  i), must have common elements in their
support. At least f(i;  i) must be in the support of both. However, this does not need to hold for
`fi (i) and `
f
 i ( i), meaning there are more degrees of freedom in designing the mechanism.
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non-negative integer zi.13 The outcome function g : M1 M2 ! (D) is dened by
the following rules:
Rule 1. If mi = (i; 0; zi) for both i 2 I, then g(m) = f(1; 2).
Rule 2. If m i = ( i; 0; z i) and mi = (i; 1; zi), then g(m) = `i(f; i).
Rule 3. In all other cases, an integer game is played: identify the agent who announces
the highest integer (if there is a tie, pick agent 1). Let agent i be the winner. Then,
the lottery implemented is g (m) = `i(f; i).
Let us rst show that f can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium of the mech-
anism. Let s = (s1; s2) be a strategy prole so that agent i of type i 2 i announces
si(i) = (i; 0; z
i). If this prole is played, Rule 1 applies, and g (s) = f . Note that
agent i of type i is indi¤erent between f and `i (f; i) by construction of the lottery
`i (f; i). Agent i of type i does not want to change only her/his type announce-
ment by incentive compatibility the new message prole would still fall under Rule
1. Assume that agent i of type i changes the second component of her/his message
into 1. In this case, Rule 2 applies and produces the lottery `i (f; i (i)). Since f
is incentive compatible, type i weakly prefers `i (f; i) to `i (f; i (i)). Therefore,
`i (f; 
i (i)) is no better than f for type i of agent i. Since the choice of type i and
of agent i are arbitrary, we conclude that s 2 B( ) and its outcome is f .
Conversely, take any s 2 B( ). We show that g (s) = f to conclude the proof.
Fix any type i of agent i. Assume that type i deviates by changing si (i) to
mi = (i; 1; z
i). Therefore, the lottery selected by the outcome function is `i(f; i)
provided that type i adjusts zi so that s/he becomes the winner of the integer game
if Rule 3 applies (as there are nitely many states). As s 2 B( ), type i weakly
prefers the lottery obtained under message si (i) to lottery `i(f; i).
Since the choice of type i of agent i and of agent i are arbitrary, the lottery
obtained under message si (i) is preferred to lottery `i(f; i) for every possible type
i of every agent i; that is, U
g(s)
i (i)  U fi (i) for all i 2 I and all i 2 i. Since f is
interim incentive e¢ cient, f cannot be welfare dominated by g (s), and so U g(s)i (i) =
13Z+ is the set of non-negative integers.
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U fi (i) for all i 2 I and all i 2 i. By the denition of Bayesian equilibrium, the
allocation rule g (s) 2 XIC . As both g (s) and f are elements of XIC and as f satises
closure, g (s) = f , as we sought.
Proof of Theorem 2
Assume that the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are met. Consider   = (M1 M2; g),
where Mi = i  F  f0; 1g  Z+, that is, each agent is asked to report a type, an
element of F , an element of the set f0; 1g and a non-negative integer zi. The outcome
function g : M1 M2 ! (D) is dened by the following rules:
Rule 1. If mi = (i; f; 0; zi) for both i 2 I, then g(m) = f(1; 2).
Rule 2. For both i 2 I, if m i = ( i; f i; 0; z i) and mi = (i; f i; 1; zi), then
g(m) = `i(f
 i; i).
Rule 3. In all other cases, an integer game is played: identify the agent who announces
the highest integer (if there is a tie, pick agent 1). Let agent i be the winner. Then,
the implemented lottery is g (m) = `i(f i; i).
Let us rst show that each f 2 F can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium
of the mechanism. To this end, we x any f 2 F . Let s = (s1; s2) be a strategy
prole so that type i 2 i announces si(i) = (i; f; 0; zi). If this prole is played,
Rule 1 applies, and g (s) = f . Moreover, type i does not want to change the third
component of her/his message into 1. In this case, Rule 2 applies and produces the
lottery `i (f; i (i)), where i (i) is her/his new type announcement. As f is incentive
compatible by assumption and we are in an environment with private values and
independent types, type i weakly prefers `i (f; i) to `i (f; i (i)). Moreover, agent i
of type i is indi¤erent between f and `i (f; i) by construction of the lottery `i (f; i).
This implies that `i (f; i (i)) is no better than f for any type i of agent i. Therefore,
the proposed strategy prole s is in B( ) and its outcome is f .
Conversely, take any s 2 B( ). We show that g (s) = f for some f 2 F .
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We x any i. Assume that type i deviates by changing si (i) into mi =
(i; f; 1; z
i). Therefore, the lottery selected by g is either `i(f i; i) if Rule 2 ap-
plies or `i(f; i) if Rule 3 applies provided that type i adjusts zi by which s/he
becomes the winner of the integer game. Since f i; f 2 F , U fi (i) = U f
 i
i (i) for all
i 2 I and all i 2 i, by the interim inseparability of F , and so `i(f i; i) and `i(f; i)
are equally good for type i. As s 2 B( ), type i weakly prefers the lottery obtained
under message si (i) to the lottery `i(f; i). As f is interim incentive e¢ cient, f
cannot be welfare dominated by g (s), and so U g(s)i (i) = U
f
i (i).
As the choice of type i is arbitrary, we have that U
g(s)
i (i) = U
f
i (i) for all i 2
I and all i 2 i. As F satises closure, it follows from g (s) 2 XIC that g (s) 2 F ,
as we sought.
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